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NOTES.
POWER OF THE COURTS OVER ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA-The increase in the number of administrative boards
created by the legislature and the extension of the powers granted to
those already created have engendered a problem which has received
but little analysis-that is, the extent of the amenability of these ad-
ministrative tribunals to the courts.
The analysis of this problem is facilitated by a separate con-
sideration of (I)'the method of procedure by which judicial review
of the orders of these boards is obtained, and (2) the extent of the
inquiry and the scope of the review permissible to the courts.
I. The Method of Procedure by Which Judicial Review Is Obtained.
At the outset it is necessary to consider the three methods of
review which were generally used in Pennsylvania: writ of error,
"appeal", and writ of certiorari.1 The distinctions between these
methods are to be found in the character of the tribunals to which
they applied and the extent of the proceedings in the tribunals which
were brought up for review by the upper court. Writ of error lay
to a court of record, "appeal" to courts of equity and proceedings
following equity forms, and certiorari to tribunals whose proceedings
were summary or in a course different from that of the common law
(as, for example, the court of a justice of the peace). A writ of
error reviewed the proceedings of the inferior tribunal as to any
errors excepted to in the course of these proceedings, an "appeal"
brought up the pleadings, the evidence and all matter necessary suffi-
ciently to acquaint the upper court with the grounds of the decree
below, while certiorari brought up only the "record" for the purpose
of allowing the upper court to determine whether or not the lower
tribunal had jurisdiction.
2
However, the Act of r899 provided that "all appellate proceed-
ings in the Supreme Court heretofore taken by writ of error, appeal
or certiorari shall hereafter be taken in a proceeding to be called an
appeal." ' As a result, the three methods in use prior to this act are
now called by the same name, but they remain applicable in the same
cases, within the same limits and have the same effects and charac-
teristics that they had prior to the Act; thus, it is now for the court
1
CONSTITUTION OF 1873, art. v, § 3, PA. STAT. (West, I92o) pp. xx-xxi.
See Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641-645, i9 Atl. 8o6-8o8 (i89o).
'An excellent discussion of the three methods is to be found in Rand v.
King, szpra note I. For extensive list of authorities, see MONAGHAN, APPEL-
LATE PRAcTIcE IN PENNSYLVANIA (I912) § 182.
Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 158, § I, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 517.
(232)
NOTES
in each particular case to determine which of the three modes is to
be applied.
4
Inasmuch as the development of judicial control over admin-
istrative boards has taken place largely through the medium of
certiorari, it is helpful to consider more closely the nature of this
writ. At common law, certiorari was a writ issued in the discretion
of the court 5 under the following circumstances: when there was
no other remedy available to the petitioner, either at common law or
by statute; 0 when the remedy available to the petitioner was inade-
quate to protect his rights; 7 and lastly, what is most important for
our purpose, certiorari would issue as a matter of course when the
tribunal was statutory in nature or-exercising its power in a manner
unknown to the common law.' Thus, the earliest and by far the
most prevalent use of certiorari was to review proceedings in justices'
courts; 9 later it was issued to review road cases, 10 contested election
proceedings,". liquor license cases 12 and proceedings purely statutory
in nature. 13
With the creation of administrative boards it would seem but
'Ra id v. King, supra note i; In re Franklin Film Corp., 253 Pa. 422, 425,
426, 98 At. 623, 624 (ii6); McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312,
320, 321, 1O4 Ad. 617, 62o (1918). It is interesting to note that the Supreme
Court requested the repeal of this act on the ground that it caused confusion.
In re Act of May 9, 1889, 25 W. N. C. 361 (i8go). In effect, this act is anal-
ogous to that of the Act of 1887, P. L. 271, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 17177,
which consolidated trespass, case and trover under the name of "trespass", and
covenant, debt and assumpsit under "assumpsit". See Hartford v. Smith, 199
Fed. 763, 765 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912).
'Pennsylvania v. Kirkpatrick, i Addison 193, 194 (Pa. 1794); Degge v.
Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162, 169, 33 Sup. Ct. 639, 64o (1913) ; Swanson v. City
of Orange, 279 Pac. 89o (Cal. 1929).
'McNeil's Contested Election, iii Pa. 235, 2 AtI. 343 (1886); Walker's
Appeal, 294 Pa. 385, 389, 144 At. 288, 289 (1928).
SHarres v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. 416, 419 (i86o) ; Roddy's Appeal, 99 Pa.
911 (1881).
'The general rule was well stated by Sharswood, J., in Appeal of Com-
missioners of Northampton County, 57 Pa. 452, 453 (1868) : ". . . where a new
jurisdiction is created by statute and the court or judge exercising it proceeds
in a summary manner, or in a course different from the common law, a certi-
orari lies." Buckmyer v, Dubs, 5 Binn. 28 (Pa. 1812) ; Wethereld v. Shupe,
iog Pa. 389, 391, 2 At. 220, 221 (1885) ; Ip re Diamond St., 196 Pa. 254, 259,
46 At. 428, 430 (19oo).
'Lenox v. McCall, 3 S. & R. 95 (Pa. 1817); Commonwealth v. Nathan,
5 Barr. 24 (Pa. 1847) ; Hart v. Cooper, 329 Pa. 297, 18 At. 122 (1889).
"In re Loretto Road, 29 Pa. 350 (1857); Esling's Appeal, 89 Pa. 2o5
(1879) ; In re Germantown Ave., 99 Pa. 479 (1882).
31 Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 1o8, 57 Ad. 344 (1904); Mul-
holland's Case, 217 Pa. 631, 66 At. 11o5 (19o7). But see Gibbon's Certiorari,
i W. N. C. 2o7 (Pa. 1873).
"Carlton's License, 127 Pa. 330, I8 Ad. 8 (1889); Brown's License, 18 Pa.
Super. 409 (igoi).
'- Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 4o3 (1862). For additional cases, see MONAGHrAX,
loc. cit. supra note 2.
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logical, since these boards were statutory in nature and tribunals
unknown to the common law, that the proper method for their review
should be certiorari. However, it must be remembered that these
boards are creatures of statute and therefore the method of re-
viewing the orders of each particular board must depend on the
terms of the statute creating it. Therefore, it is necessary to ascer-
tain the provisions of the statute in question and to determine the
judicial interpretation placed thereon.
Such statutes may be grouped into three classes: (i) those
statutes which merely state there shall be an appeal; (2) those statutes
which in addition to providing that there shall be an appeal, specify
the scope of review permissible on such appeal; (3) those statutes
which provide that the decision of the board shall be final and con-
clusive and that no appeal shall be taken.
Class i. This type of statute "I presents the problem of resolv-
ing the apparent ambiguity of the word "appeal", which may mean
an appeal in the nature of writ of error, certiorari, or the common
law "appeal". 15 Since at common law, in the absence of any statutory
provision, certiorari 16 would have been the proper method, these
boards being purely statutory in nature, and, since "appeal" does not
clearly indicate an intention to change the proper common law method,
the courts have naturally and very reasonably concluded that certiorari
was the proper method to review the orders of boards under such
statutes."-
Class 2. While this type of statute Is presents a similar necessity
for resolving the ambiguity of the term "appeal", the provisions
"Among these statutes are: Act of May 15, 1915, P. L. 534, PA. STAT.
(West, 192o) § 21145 (creating Board of Motion Picture Censors); Act of
June 18, I915, P. L. 1027, § I, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 9585 (creating Board of
registration Commissioners).
Supyra note 3.
x By "certiorari" reference is made to "an appeal in the nature of certiorari,"
since, under the Act of 1889, "appeal" is the only correct descriptive term.
'In re Franklin Film Corp., supra note 4; followed in Metro Film Ex-
change v. Board of Censors, 27 Dist. 45, 49 (Pa. 1917) ; it re Vitagraph, Inc.,
ii D. & C. 45, 47 (1928) (interpreting Act of 1915, supra note 14). Cf. Equi-
table Motion Picture Corporation's Appeal, 25 Dist. 114, 115 (Pa. 1915) (inter-
preting Act of 1915, supra note 14) ; Mulholland's Case, 217 Pa. 631, 66 Atl.
1105 (1907) (interpreting a similar statute, Act of Feb. 17, i9o6, P. L. 49).
'8Among such statutes are: Act of June 26, 1919, P. L. 642, PA. STAT.
(West, 192o) §§ 22053, 2205 (creating the Workmen's Compensation Board;
provides that the board shall certify its "entire record", which includes "notes
of testimony"); Act of Feb. 19, 1926, P. L. 16, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928)
§ 14098c-13 (creating Alcohol Permit Board; provides that board shall file an-
swer which shall include "grounds for its decision" and "such other grounds as
shall in the meantime accrue or be discovered") ; Act of April 13, 1927, P. L.
273, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § I9867b-I9 (creating the Securities Commission;
provides board shall in answer certify "grounds for its decision" and the "record"
which shall include the "testimony" and "findings of fact") ; Act of July 26,
1913, P. L. 1374. PA. STAT. (SupP. 1928) § 18T78 (creating Public Service Com-
mission; provides that commission shall certify under seal the record, which
shall include the "evidence" and "findings of fact").
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specifying the extent of the review give a fairly clear indication of
the legislative intent. By a comparison of the scope of review pro-
vided for in the particular statute, with the scope of review permissible
under each of the three methods, and a determination as to which
one of the scopes of review under the three respective methods, the
scope of review provided- for in the particular statute most clearly
resembles, the ambiguity is resolved. Thus, where the statute specifies
that merely the "record" shall be certified, then the courts reach the
conclusion that certiorari is the proper method of appeal because at
common law only the "record" was brought up on certiorari."9
Similarly, where the statute specifies that the "record", the testimony,
and the findings of fact shall be certified, the courts conclude that
an appeal in the nature of a writ of error is contemplated. 20  And
in the case of a statute specifying that not only the grounds of the
decision of the lower court or tribunal, but also any additional or
newly discovered evidence shall be certified, the courts conclude that a
"hearing de novo" is the proper method.
21
While no harm is done by determining which of the three
methods was intended, it is highly improbable that the legislature
contemplated any one of the three methods. Moreover, no useful
purpose is served by concluding that any particular one of the three
was contemplated, because, regardless of the conclusion, the name of
the proceeding for bringing up the review is "appeal", and the scope
of review is precisely that specified.
Class 3. This type of statute 22 presents two questions: (i)
can any appeal at all be taken? (2) if so, what type of appeal? The
first question presents a constitutional problem. The Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall have "appellate jurisdiction by
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error in all cases as is now or may here-
after be provided for by law." 23 A litigant is therefore, entitled, as
'Verbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co., 286 Pa. 199, 133 Ati. 256 (1926) (inter-
preting the Act of igig, supra note 18). It is interesting to compare this decision
with that in McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., supra note 4, interpreting the
previous Workmen's Compensation statute which did not provide that "notes of
testimony" be included in the "record".
' V. & S. Bottle Co. v. P. S. C., 7o Pa. Super. 3o8 (1918) (interpreting the
Act of 1913, su pra note 18). There is an exception to this rule in cases where
the order of the board amounts to confiscation of property, in which case the
hearing is de novo before the Superior Court. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio
Valley Water Co., 27! Pa. 346, 350, 351, 114 Atl. 369, 371 (1921).
' Kutz v. Alcohol Permit Board. 295 Pa. 394, 145 Atl. 536 (1929) (inter-
preting the Act of 1926, supra note 18). Cf. Premier Cereal & Beverage Com-
pany v. Alcohol Permit Board, 292 Pa. 127, 133, 14o Atl. 858, 86o (1928). Bag-
ley v. Cameron. 282 Pa. 84, 94, 127 Atl, 311, 314 (1925) (interpreting Act of
June 14, 1923, P. L. 779, which preceded Act of 1927, supra note i).
'Among such statutes are: Act of May 25, 1921, P. L. 1125, § i, PA. STAT.
(Supp. 1924) § 9g7oi (authorizing common pleas courts to act as computation
boards in election cases) ; Act of July 9, i807, P. L. 223 (supplanted by Act of
July 9, 1919, P. L. 832, § 2, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 9627) creating salary
boards in the various counties.
" Supra note i.
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a constitutional right, to that one of the three methods which was ap-
propriate to the tribunal from which he wishes to take an appeal.
At common law the appropriate method for appeal from statutory
boards was, as has already been indicated, certiorari. Therefore, if
the statutory provisions mean to deny a petitioner from the order
of an administrative board the right to certiorari, they are in conflict
with the Constitution. The courts, in accordance with the doctrine
favoring that construction which will uphold the constitutionality of
a statute, have construed such provisions as effecting simply a denial
of writ of error and "appeal" from the orders of these boards, but
as not effecting a denial of certiorari.2  Thus, even under such
statutes, the common law certiorari will lie to test the jurisdiction of
the lower tribunals."
1I. The Extent of the Inquiry and Scope of Review Permissible to
the Courts.
Having determined the methods by which review of the orders
of administrative boards is obtained, our next problem is to ascertain
the extent of the inquiry permissible under these methods.
i. Appeal in the Nature of Certiorari-While certiorari is the
proper method of appeal in all cases coming under statutes of class i
and class 3, and in a number of cases coming under statutes of class 2,
yet the scope of review afforded by certiorari under statutes of classes
i and 2 differs from the scope under statutes of class 3.2
Originally certiorari brought up only the technical record, which
consisted of the pleadings and judgment of the lower tribunal
2 7
and did not include the evidence, 28  depositions, or the opinion
2 2ist Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 278, 126 AtI. 566, 568
(1924).
0'21st Senatorial District Nomination, supra note 24 (interpreting Act of
1921, sispra note 22) ; Smith's Petition, 292 Pa. 140, 142, 14o Atl. 854,855 (1928) ;
Armstrong's Appeal, 293 Pa. 16, 141 Ati. 633, 635 (1928) (interpreting a similar
statute-Act of April 23, 1927, P. L. 360, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 99472-5) ;
Robb's Nomination Certificate, 188 Pa. 212, 213, 41 AtI. 477 (i898) (interpret-
ing Act of 1927, supra note 22) ; Bedford v. Rosser, 283 Pa. 345, 347, 129 Ati.
92, 93 (1925) ; Sterrett v. McLean, 293 Pa. 557, 560, 143 Ati. i89, 190 (1928) ;
Walker's Appeal, 294 Pa. 385, 389, 144 At. 288, 289 (1928) (interpreting Act of
i9o7, supra note 22). An interesting problem was presented where no method
of appeal was mentioned in the statute and the court held that the appeal was in
nature of common law certiorari. Bangor Company's Electric Petition, 295 Pa.
228, 232, 145 Atl. 128, 129 (1929).
'This confusion in the scope of review under certiorari is found in other
jurisdictions as well as Pennsylvania. See DICKINSON, ADmINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW (1927) § 62.
"Chase v. Miller, mrpra note 13; Esling's Appeal, 89 Pa. 205, 2o9 (1866);
ri re Germantown Ave., supra note IO. But see Kimber v. Schuylkill, 20 Pa.
366 (1853).
'Dolan's Appeal, io8 Pa. 366 (1885) ; Holland v. White, 120 Pa. 228, 13
AtI. 782 (1882). But the evidence may be part of the record by agreement.
Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 166 Pa. 642, 31 Atl. 345, 346 (1895).
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of the lower court.21 Moreover, the upper court could examine the
"record" solely to determine whether the lower tribunal acted within
the limits of its jurisdiction and whether its proceedings were regular.
It is thus evident that at common law, review under certiorari was
as narrow as possible.
With the creation of increasingly large numbers of administrative
boards and the consequent increase in the use of certiorari, the ap-
pellate courts began to chaff under the narrow confines of certiorari.
The first step toward enlarging the scope of review under certiorari
was to include the opinion of the lower tribunal in the "record" for
the purpose of better enabling the court to determine whether there
was any "basis" for the lower tribunal's assumption of jurisdiction.2
This led to the use of th& opinion to correct errors of law evidenced
in the lower court's opinion and a widening of the scope of review
in connection with boards coming under classes i and 2. The
courts took this earlier step on the pretense of finding an analogy
between proceedings under these statutes and equity proceedings
under which the decree of the chancellor was examinable.2 An
apparent qualification in this use of the opinion of the lower tribunal
is to the effect that "findings of fact" in such opinion may be con-
sidered by the upper court only as they concern "fundamental ques-
tions".32  It would seem that since the courts have to decide when
the findings of fact concern "fundamental questions" and when they
do not, the effect is in reality to permit the appellate courts to use the
opinion of the lower tribunal for whatever purpose they wish.
Up to the passage of the Act of April 8, 199, the appellate courts
refused to consider any of the evidence as part of the "record". 3
However, the Act of 1919 provided that testimony taken before a
court of record should be considered a part of the "record" to be
reviewed by appellate courts even when the appeal is in the nature of
certiorari 4 The courts, conceding that the probable intent of the
legislature was to have this Act apply to appeals from administrative
boards, have allowed a review of the evidence as part of the record
"' Darby v. Sharon Hill, 112 Pa. 667, 4 At. 722 (1886) ; In re Germantown
Ave., supra note io; Independence Party Nomination, su~pra note i-.
'o Independence Party Nomination, =rpra note Ii; Cramer's Election Case,
248 Pa. 2o8, 93 AUt. 937 (9,5) ; McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., supra note
4; 28th Congr. Dist. Nomination, 268 Pa. 313, 321, 112 Atl. 74, 76 (192o).
'In re Franklin Mfg. Corp., supra note 4; McCauley v. Imp. Woolen Co.,
supra note 4; 28th Congressional Election, supra note 29; Plains Twp. Elec-
tion Returns, 28o Pa. 520, i24 AUt. 678 (1924).
'Smith's Petition, 292 Pa. 140, 142, 14o At. 854, 855 (1928).
' McCauley v. Imp. Woolen Co., supra note 4.
'Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 553. To the
effect that this act supplements the record and enlarges scope of review on cer-
tiorari, see Scranton v. People's Coal Co., 274 Pa. 63, 117' Atl. 673, 676, 677
(1922).
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in appeals from such boards.3 5 However, the courts have intimated
that in applying the Act to the particular administrative boards con-
cerning which the question has arisen, they are indulging in extremely
liberal statutory construction, since administrative boards are not
strictly courts of record in the common law sense of the term. It
would seem that by such intimations the courts have in effect re-
served to themselves the power to deny the application of the Act to
particular administrative bodies in connection with which the ques-
tion might arise in the future.
Even though this statute does not in terms restrict the extent
of the use of the testimony, yet the courts have made it clear that
the testimony is to be used only to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the order or findings of the board are supported by sufficient and
legally competent evidence.30
Thus, it is seen that the courts exercise over the boards coming
under class i statutes and those statutes of class 2 providing for an
appeal in the nature of certiorari, merely a supervisory power, very
closely analogous to that exercised by the appellate courts over in-
ferior courts. The findings of fact of the board are not disturbed
and the sphere of the utility of the board is carefully preserved.
While certiorari is the method of appeal from boards under
class 3 statutes the interpretation of these statutes by the courts has
precluded any such development and extension in the scope of review
on certiorari as has taken place under statutes of class I and some
statutes of class 2. As has already been stated,3 7 these statutes are
interpreted as denying any method of appeal except that guaranteed
by the Constitution, which in effect guarantees the appeal in use and
appropriate at the common law. In the case of tribunals such as
administrative boards, this method was the common law writ of
certiorari bringing up merely the technical record solely to test juris-
diction. And the courts have taken the position that to extend tle
scope of review as regards these boards would be a flagrant disregard
of the legislative intent.38
2. Scope of Review Under Appeal in the Nature of Writ of
Error-Under statutes of class 2 which have been interpreted as
contemplating a review in the nature of writ of error, the appellate
courts inquire only as to errors excepted to in the course of the pro-
ceedings below.3 9 An order of the board is presumed to be prima
' Plains Twp. Election Returns, supra note 30. Smith's Petition, st'ra
note 31; Sterrett v. MacLean, supra note 24; Gallagher v. D. L. & W., 72 Pa.
Super. I24, 127, 128 (1918).
"Verbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co., supra note 18. An interesting list of
authorities comparing the attitude of the courts before the Act of 1939 with that





facie evidence that the proceedings conformed to law.40  Moreover,
it is essential that the record be clear, otherwise the courts will remand
the case for a further hearing.41 Recalling the extent of review per-
missible under certiorari at present it is to be noted that review by
writ of error permits of hardly more supervision by the courts than
is permitted under certiorari. In fact, more supervision is permitted
by the court under certiorari in that the court may reverse for errors
of law, even though'not excepted to in the course of the proceedings
below.
3. Hearin'g de Novo-Some statutes of class 2 provide 42 that
the board shall certify, not only "the grounds of its decision" but also
"such other grounds" as may be discovered between the time the
order is handed down and the time the appeal is filed. Such statutes
are necessarily interpreted as giving the court the right to hear de tovio
all the'evidence and to decide the case on the merits. The legislature,
by providing for such a review, would seem unduly to reduce the
utility of the particular board.
B. R. J. Jr.
RIGHT TO RESIST A FOREIGN JUDGMENT FOR FRAuD-Before
entering on a discussion of the right to resist a foreign judgment for
fraud, it is well to determine just what the term "foreign judgment"
means. In the United States, it is used by the courts in referring to
judgments rendered in other states as well as to those rendered in a
foreign country. In the interest of clarity, a distinction has been
made between "foreign judgments", i. e. those rendered in a foreign
country, and "sister state judgments", i. e. those rendered in a state.'
Since there are several important differences in the legal treatment
of sister state and foreign judgments, this distinction will be adopted
here.
Sister State .udgnzents
The question of the right to resist a sister state judgment for
fraud involves a consideration of the methods by which that right
may be asserted. These are, first, a plea of fraud as a defense in the
action on the judgment; and, second, an action to enjoin on the ground
of fraud the enforcement of the sister state" judgment.
The general rule is laid down in many states that a plea of fraud
40Scranton City v. P. S. C., 8o Pa. Super. 549, 554 (1923) ; Jenkins Twp. v.
P. S. C., 65 Pa. Super. 122 (1916).
'Kane & Elk v. P. S. C., 69 Pa. Super. 413, 418 (1918) ; Erie City v. P.
S. C., 78 Pa. Super. 512 (1922). See BLANNING, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
IN PENNSYLVANIA (1924) § 124.
"1 Sapra note 20. Also Ben Avon Boro. v: Ohio Valley Water Co., szprar
note 19.
23 FREEmAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1482.
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is not good in an action on a sister state judgment.2 One reason
given is that no such plea to a record was permitted at common law,
the only plea allowed being mul tiel record.3 A sounder reason
is that the federal constitution, 4 which governs the recognition of
sister state judgments, requires each state to give the judgment of
another state the same faith and credit that it has in the state where
rendered; 5 and since it is almost universally the rule that a domestic
judgment cannot be impeached for fraud in an action upon it," a
judgment of a sister state likewise cannot be impeached for fraud.
This general rule, however, does not allow for the several states
which do allow a plea of fraud to an action on a domestic judgment.7
Accordingly, many states have modified the general rule to the effect
that a plea of fraud is admissible if it could have been re-
ceived in the courts of the jurisdiction where the judgment was ren-
dered." So modified, the rule best carries out the requirement of the
full faith and credit clause.
Notwithstanding the fact that judgments as domestic judgments
cannot be impeached for fraud, many cases hold or contain dicta to the
effect that as sister state judgments they may be so impeached.9 Most
of these cases have arisen in jurisdictions where the distinction between
law and equity has been abolished. In such states the same relief
may be obtained by an equitable defense to the action at law as could
have been heretofore obtained by an independent action in equity.
'Lucas v. Copeland, 2 Stew. 15, (Ala. 1829) ; Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331
(188o); Ala. Great So. R. Co. v. Hill, 139 Ga. 224, 76 S. E. iooi (1912) ; Glenn
v. Williams, 6o Md. 93 (1882); Goodrich v. Stevens, 116 Mass. 17o (1874);
Dunlap v. Byers, 1io Mich. 2O9, 67 N. W. 2o67 (1896); McDonald v. Drew, 64
N. H. 547, 15 Ad. 548 (1888); Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio io8 (i898);
Benton v. Burgot, io S. & R. 24o (Pa. 1823). See ANN. CAS. 1914D, 999; note
to 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 9o5 (191o).
"Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch 481 (U. S. 1813); Maxwell v. Stewart, 21
Wall. 71 (U. S. 1874); Bank of North America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433
(1859) ; Brainard v. Fowler, iI9 Mass. 262 (1876).
'Article IV, § I: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, rec-
ords, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
Mills v. Duryea, sapra note 3.
"Hodgdon v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 75 Cal. 642, 17 Pac. 928 (i888);
Weiss v. Guerinean, io9 Ind. 438, 9 N. E. 399 (1886) ; FREEMAN, op. cit. supra
note I, § 331.
'Ellis v. Kelly, 8 Bush. 621 (Ky. 1871) ; State v. Little, I N. H. 257 (818).
It is a matter of doubt as to whether Pennsylvania is included in this group.
See Phelps v. Benson, 161 Pa. 418, 29 AtI. 86 (1894) ; Ogle. v. Baker, 137 Pa.
378, 2o Atl. 998 (189o). See Woodward, Collateral Attack Upon Judgments on
the Ground of Fraud (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2O3.
8 Bonfils v. Gillespie, 25 Colo. App. 496, 139 Pac. 1054 (1914) ; Sammis v.
Wrightman, 31 Fla. IO, 12 So. 526 (1893) ; Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76, 35 N. E.
761 (1893); Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Iowa 58 (1866) ; Smedes v. Ilsley, 68 Miss.
59o, 10 So. 75 (I8go).
'See cases cited in note, ANN. CAS. 1914 D, 999.
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In these jiurisdictions the defendant in an action on a sister state judg-
ment has been allowed to enter a plea of fraud.10  It has been urged
in explanation that a judgfiient creditor in bringing an action in
another state must submit to the law of the forum and meet the
charge of faiaud in any form which might be resorted to in an action
on a domestic judgment." But this would seein to be laying down a
test not waranted by the full faith and credit clause, .vhich makes the
effect of a judgment depend on its effect in the state where rendered
and not oh the effect of the domestic judgments in the state where it is
sought to be en-torced. Such cases are not authority for the general
proposition that fraud may be pleaded to a sister state judgment, since
it is in reality equitable relief that is being given in a plea addressed to
the equity jowers of the coui-t. This fact accounts for the rule that
although a judgment arose in a state where equitable defenses could be
asserted in a'n action at law, if an action upon it is brought in a state
where a domestic judgmeht may be avoided only by proceedings in
equity, such proceedings must nevertheless be resorted to in order to
avoid the judgmeht,"
2
In many of the remaining cases that lay down the ru6le that
fraud is a defense ifi al actibri on a sister state judgment, the fraud
relied on was such as to affect the jurisdiction of the court' 3  If
limited only to cases of fratid going to the jurisdiction, the rule is a
sound one. Lack 6f jurisdiction is always a ground of defense
against an action upon a judgment, 4 and fraud affecting the juris-
diction is equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction.
A fei;r cases have decided unequivocally that fraud is a good
defense to an action bn a sister state judgment, evren though the fraud
was non-jurisdictional and law and equity had not been combined. 5
Such a result is not justified hinder the Federal constitution.
It is one of the fuidaiehtal gfounds of equitable jurisdiction
that relief riy be given against a jidgtiient for fraud.'6 Most juris-
Wyeth Haidware Co. v. Larig & Co.; 54 Mo. App. 147 (1893) ; Keeler v.
Elston, 22 Neb. 36, 34 N. W. 891 (1887); Levin v. Gladstien, 1421N. C. 482,
55 S. E. 37i (I9O6); Mottu v. Davs, 15, N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969 (I9O9):
Shary v. Eszlingeri, 45 N. D. i33; i76 N. W. 938 (92O).
" Fam4, N, op. cit. .supra note i, § 1402.
C Kansas City etc., R. R. Co. v. Morgan, 76 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 6th, i896).
Cf. Griudlach v. Park, 140 Minn. 78, 165 N. W. 96b (i 918)
'Abercrombie v. Aberbiombie 64 Kan. 29, 67 Pac. 539 (9o2); Clark v.
Ogilvie, iii Ky. 183, 635 W. 429 (39o) ; Forrest v. Frey, 2I8 Ill. 365, 75 N. E.
789 (19o5) ; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Ioiva 260 (i871) ' Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272
(i869). But the defense is not available to a defendant .who has presented such
fraud to the court r~nderinj the jixdgment, and it has decided adversely to de-
fendan. .Tootle v. McClellan, 7 Ind. Ter. 64, I6 S. W- 766 (9o7); see
Jaster v. Currie, i8 U. S. i4, 25 Sup. Ct. 614 (1664) ; Frawley IV. Pa. Casualty
Co., x24. Fed. 259 (q. C. M. D. I a. 39o3).
" Christmas iv. Russdl, 8 Will. 90 (U. S. i866)..
SKeele v. Eiston, 22 N ]5. 316, 34 N. W. 8gr (i897) ; Davis v. Smith, 5
Ga. 274 (8498)..
is Chicago . I. & P. R. C6. v. Gallicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 192o).
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dictions, accordingly, allow a bill in equity to enjoin the enforcement
of a sister state judgment obtained by fraud.'7  This is not a viola-
tion of the full faith and credit clause of the constitution. The reason
given in some cases is that the judgment is really not denied full faith
and credit, but that equity acts only on the person of the plaintiff, over
whom it has jurisdiction, to prevent him from securing an unconscion-
able advantage from a judgment fraudulently obtained.' But no
recourse to this familiar sophistry is needed to justify the action of
the equity courts. If equity in the state where the judgment was
rendered could give such relief, there is no denial of full faith and
credit when the equity court of the state where the judgment is sued
on gives the same relief."
A few cases have held that judgments of a sister state cannot
be resisted for fraud at all, and have laid down the rule that relief
on this ground must be sought in the courts of the state where
the judgment was rendered.20 It is said that full faith and credit is
not given to the sister state judgment if it may be resisted for fraud.
Such decisions give to a sister state judgment more force than they
had in the state where rendered and go to a length not required by the
constitution.2' It is an anomaly that a state where a domestic judg-
ment may be resisted for fraud should hold that a sister state judg-
ment cannot.
In most states, therefore, a judgment of a sister state may be
resisted for fraud either in an independent suit in equity to enjoin
its enforcement, or by a plea in the action to enforce the judgment.
But not all types of fraud will warrant a court in granting relief
against the judgment. A distinction is made between extrinsic fraud,
or fraud in the procurement of the judgment, which will vitiate a
judgment, and intrinsic fraud, or fraud in the cause of action, which
is not a basis for relief from a judgment..2  The fraud which is
denominated extrinsic fraud is such fraud as has prevented the de-
fendant from having a fair trial and an opportunity to put in his
'Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 458
(1922) ; Pearce v. Olney, 2o Conn. 544 (1850) ; Engel v Scheuerman, 4o Ga.
2o6 (1869) ; Ward v. Quinlivin, 57 Mo. 425 (1874) ; Eaton v. Hasty, 6 Neb. 419
(1877); Ross v. Wood, 70 N. Y. 8 (0877).
a Levin v. Gladstien, supra note 10.
"Pearce v. Olney, supra note 17.
'Ambler v. Whipple, 739 Ill. 311, i28 N. E. 841 (i89i); Sims v. Talbot,
27 Miss. 487 (1854)'; McDonald v. Drew, 64 N. H. 547, 15 Atl. 748 (1888).
A judgment cannot be impeached for fraud by a party or privy to it. Dow
v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. 761 (1893).
'U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (0878) ; De Soto Coal Min. & Devel.
Co. v. Hill, 094 Ala. 537, 69 So. 948 (1915) ; Levin v. Gladstien, vipra note 1o.
'Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., sotpra note 17; Mottu v. Davis,
sulpra note io; Hudson v. Sheaf e, 41 S. D. 475, 071 N. W. 320 (1919).
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defense to the action. If he has had such a trial the mere fact that
fraud in the cause of action has been practised is no ground for relief
against the judgment.
23
Thus fraud in the concoction of the cause of action or in the
securing of the instrument on which the action is based 24 has been
held insufficient. This defense must be interposed at the trial of the
action or the right will be lost. And this applies to any defense'of
fraud which might have been urged against the original action.2
Nor will the fact that perjury and false testimony were instrumental
in obtaining the judgment avail the defendant.2 6 This arises from
the fact that the existence thereof cannot be ascertained except by.
a retrial of the issue before the former court.
As a corollary of the rule that intrinsic fraud cannot invalidate
a judgment of a sister state, is the rule that anything in issue before
the court rendering the judgment and decided by that court will not
be a basis for an attack on the judgment. Therefore, if the court
which rendered the judgment has had before it the same issue of
fraud and decided adversely to the defendant, he will not be allowed
to attack the judgment for such fraud, although it would otherwise
have been sufficient to invalidate the judgment.
2 7
Fraud which will be available to the defendant in his attack upon
a sister state judgment must, as has been said, be such as has deprived
the defendant of his opportunity to make a full and fair defense.
Such fraud is, of course, of many kinds. Thus, where the defendant
has been prevented from appearing to defend by the threats of the
plaintiff, the judgment has not been enforced.2 Where the defendant
has failed to present his defense because the plaintiff agreed to drop
the suit,29 or to compromise the case,3 0 or informed the defendant that
the suit had been dismissed,31 or by any other agreement or promise
lulled the defendant into false security,". 2 the judgment may be at-
/
' Hockaday v. Skeggs, i8 La. Ann. 68I (1866); Packer v. Thompson, 25
Neb. 688, 41 N. W. 650 (889).
" Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; Payne v. O'Shea,
84 Mo. 129 (z884).
'Weir v. Vail, 65 Cal. 466, 4 Pac. 422 (1884) ; Hockaday v. Skeggs, supra.
note 23; Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 489 (IgoI).
'Riley v. Murray, 8 Ind. 354 (1856) ; Mahoney v. State Ins. Co., 133 Iowa
570, i1o N.W. 1041 (907). But in some states perjury is by statute a ground
of equitable relief. Mix,. GEN. STATS. (Appendix, 1926) § 2920.
' Tootle v. McClellan, silpra note iQ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 68 S.
W. 240 (i9io).
' Coffee v. Neely, 2 Heisk. 304 (Tenn. 1871) (Defendant could not appear
without endangering his life).
'Rogers v. Gwinn, 2i Iowa 58 (I866) ; Pearce v. Olney, supra note 17.
'Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. I15 (1872).
'mWagner v. Shank, 59 Md. 313 (1882).
' U. S. v. Throckmortbn, supra note 27. See Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. I,85 S. W. Xi (0906).
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tacked by the defendant. Another example of extrinsic fraud is the
connivance of the defendant's counsel with the plaintiff, or collusion
between the plaintiff and another party defendant.
3
Another type of fraud, always held to be a sufficient ground of
attack on a sister state judgment, does not fall into the class of ex-
trinsic fraud. This is fraud going to the jurisdiction of the court.
It may consist of fraudulently decoying the defendant into the juris-
diction,34 or of causing an unauthorized attorney to appear for him,3 1
or of a false return of service by the sheriff.3 Such fraud is equiva-
lent to a lack of jurisdiction, which is always a reason for the attack
of a sister state judgment. But even in this case, if the court render-
ing the judgment had before it the issue of fraud as to the jurisdic-
tion and decided it adversely to the defendant, another court will not
retry the question and will hold the decision of the first court con-
clusive on the question of fraud.
37
Foreign Judgments
While there are diverse opinions in regard to sister state judg-
ments, it is universally held that fraud is a good plea to an action on
a judgment rendered by a court in a foreign country.38  This, how-
ever, does not preclude equitable relief against a foreign judgment
obtained by fraud, which is likewise available.3 9
While the rule that a foreign judgment may be impeached for
fraud is universal, there is no such general agreement as to what kind
of fraud will be held sufficient to vitiate a foreign judgment.
In the United States, the rule followed by the federal and a
majority of the state courts is that a foreign judgment is conclusive
on the merits, unless a judgment rendered in this country would not
"3 White v. Reid, 7o Hun. 197, 24 N. Y. Supp. 29o (1893).
" Dunlap v. Cody, supra note I3; Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 625 (1879). But
mere request to go into jurisdiction to defend another suit has been held not to
be fraud. Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495 (1883).
, Marx v. Fore, 51 Me. 69 (1863) ; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272 (387o) ; Rose
v. Northwest F. & M. Ins. Co., 67 Fed. 434 (E. D. Wis. 1895).
, Norwood v. Cobb, 15 Tex. 5oo, 505 (1857) ; Anthony v. Masters, 28 Ind..
App. 239, 62 N. E. 505 (1902).
' Tootle v. McClellan, supra note 13. See Frawley v. Pa. Casualty Co.,
supra note 13.
'Reimers v. Druce, 23 Beav. 145 (Eng. 1857); Henderson v. Henderson.
6 Q. B. 288 (1844); Cammell v. Sewell, 3 H. & N. 617 (Eng. 1858); Rankin
v. Goddard, 54 Me. 28 (1866) ; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146 (1862).
' Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279 (Eng. 1837); Harrison v. Triplex Gold
Mines, Ltd., 33 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. ist, 1929). But see Ochsenheim V.
Papelier, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 695 (1873), which holds that to the extent that the
plea of fraud is a good defense to an action at law on such judgment, a court of
equity will not interfere with the action at law, but will leave the defendant to
make his defense there.
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be conclusive on the merits in the particular foreign country.40 Under
this rule, where a foreign judgment of a countrywhich does not
give conclusive effect to our judgments is sought to be enforced, the
entire merits of the controversy are thrown open to re-examination.
Obviously, this would include consideration of fraud in the original
cause of action, and also fraud in the trial of the cause consisting in
the production of evidence claimed to be false, or any other form
of fraud which the defendant might have urged, or did urge, as a
defense to the original action.41
This rule has been severely criticized, 42 and is open to very
serious objections. It destroys all consistency in our rulings on the
question of the effect of a foreign judgment, and makes our courts
instruments of reprisal, rather than tribunals for the administration
of justice. Reciprocity is a political, not a judicial, weapon.4  For
these reasons at least one state has refused to adopt the rule.44
In those cases where under the reciprocity rule a judgment of a
foreign country is conclusive on the merits, and in the states which
deny the reciprocity doctrine, the foreign judgment may be attacked
only for fraud in its procurement. The tendency in the U. S. has
been to follow the rule applicable to sister state judgments, and to
hold only such fraud sufficient to impeach a foreign judgment as
goes to the jurisdiction, or as has prevented a fair trial on the merits,
and has not been in issue before the foreign court. Under this rule,
fraud in the cause of action, or against which the defendant might
have protected himself at the trial, such as false testimony and perjury,
or any fraud which was in issue before the court which rendered the
judgment and was decided by it, will not be admitted to impeach the
validity of the foreign judgment.
45
Evidtence of this tendency is to be found in statutes declaring that
foreign judgments shall have the same effect as they have where
rendered, 47 thus giving them the same status as sister state judgments.
In England, a foreign judgment is conclusive except for lack
of jurisdiction and fraud .4 But the fraud for which a judgment
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. u3, i6 Sup. Ct. 139 (1894) ; Traders Tr. Co.
v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N. W. 735 (iq2o).
Hilton v. Guyot, mipra note 40.
=McDonald v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 71 N. H. 448, 52 Ati. 982 (19oi).
"WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. i9o5) § 3.
"Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y, i4, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).
'Fisher v. Felding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Adt. 714 (i89S) ; Harrison v. Triplex
Gold Mines, Ltd., s pra note 3q; Coveney v. Phi~cator, 132 Mich. 258, 93 N. W.
619 (1o3).
FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1482.
'Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152
Pac. 542 (1915) : CAL. CODES OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) § 1915; Jones v.
Jamison, i5 La. Ann. 35 (i86o). In these states the judgment is a merger and
inhibits any further proceedings on the original cause of action. Ibid.
" Reimers v, Druce, supra note 38; Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, L. R. io Q. B.
295 (1882),
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may be attacked is not only such fraud as has prevented the defendant
from putting in his defense, and as has not been in issue or decided
by the court which rendered the judgment. A judgment may be at-
tacked for fraud consisting of false testimony or false evidence or any
other fraud by the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the defendant might
have protected himself against it at the trial of the original action,
notwithstanding that the consideration of such fraud involves a re-
examination of the merits of the case, and notwithstanding that the
charge of fraud was investigated and rejected in the foreign court.49
The rule is justified on the ground that the case is retried on its
merits, not to show that the foreign court was wrong, but only to
show that the court was fraudulently misled into coming to the wrong
decision-a question which was not in issue before it."0 However, this
seems but an evasion of the important fact that the merits of the
action are nevertheless being retried, especially when the fraud of
the plaintiff has been set up as a defense in, and rejected by, the for-
eign court. The rule is opposed to the principles laid down in the
earlier English cases on the subject,5' and is an unfortunate reaction
to the discredited doctrine that a foreign judgment is only prima
facie evidence of a debt and may be re-examined on the merits.5-
H. Z.
PRIORITY OF JUDGMENT LIENS ON AFTER-ACQUIRED REAL
ESTATE-At common law a judgment carried with it no lien;' such
a right was inconsistent with feudal principles.2 However, the in-
creasing commercial need of greater security for judgment creditors,
accompanied by a weakening of the traditional attitude against the
alienation of land, gave rise to a series of statutes in England by
which the judgment creditor obtained a lien on the judgment debtor's
'* Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, mspra note 48; Vadala v. Lawes, L. R. 25 Q. B.
310 (189o).
T0Ibid.
' Bank of Australia v. Mas, 2o L. J. Q. B. 284 (I85I), which held that
where fraud was involved in the. issue before the foreign court, a defense set-
ting up this fraud in an action on the judgment was bad since it would be re-
opening the merits of the case. Ironically enough, this case was cited by Lord
Coleridge as authority for his decision in Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, supra
note 48.
" For a discussion of the development of the doctrine that a foreign judg-
ment is conclusive on the merits, see 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 19o2) §§ 825
et seq.
1 Morsell v. First Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 357, 36o (1875) ; U. S. v. Harpoot-
lian, 24 F. (2d) 646, 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Tnn
HISTOY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 596. Except for debts due the
king. McMillan v. Davenport, 44 Mont. 23, 3o, 11S Pac. 756, 758 (1911).
'See opinion of Lewis, J., in Hutcheson v. Grubbs, 8o Va. 251, 254 (1885).
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real estate.3 In all the states, this right of lien has been conferred
upon the judgment creditor either by statute or by the acceptance of
the English statutes as part of the common law of the state.'
A judgment lien is a species of general ligi.' It does not attach
to any particular piece of the debtor's real eatate, but merely gives
the lienor the right to levy on any piece of the debtor's realty, sub-
ject, of course, to the equities existing at the commencement of the
lien.8 There is, however, a difference of opinion as to the exact time
when a judgment lien attaches. Some courts consider it to arise at
the rendition of the judgment; 7 others at the docketing of the judg-
mentA However, as far as the solution of the problem of this note
is concerned, it is immaterial which of these two views is adbpted.
The lien, moreover, is not affected by a conveyance of the land by
the judgment debtor., Since the purchaser has at least constructive
notice of the lien from the docketing of the judgment, the judgment
creditor may levy on the land conveyed to him, provided, of course,
that the debtor does not remain owner of sufficient real estate to
satisfy the judgment.10
In almost all jurisdictions, either by statutory provision or by
following the doctrine of the English common law, judgment liens
have been extended to after-acquired property." It seems a logical
'WESTMNSrt- II (i3 Edw. I) c. I8 (i285) was the first of these.
'1 Bi.Acx, JuDcatNTs (2d ed. 19o2) §398; 2 F#XXMAN, JUDGMET Ts (5th
ed. i925) §916.
5 Lanning v. Carpenter, 48 N. Y. 408 (I8 ). Thus the judgment lien re-
sembles a bank's or factor's lien as distinguished fi-om an innkeeper's, a me-
chanic's or a carrier's lien.
Cotiad v. The Atlantic Insurance Co., I Pet. 386 (U. 8. 1828) ; Glen
Morris-Glytidon Supply Co. v. McColgati, ioo Md. 479, 60 At. 6o8 (i9o5) ; see
Huff v. Sweetser, 8 Cal. App. 689, 695i 97 Pac. 705, 7o8 (10o8); Brown v.
Harding; 17b N. C. 253, 266, 86 S. E. lOlO, ioi6 (1915). It/is, however, spe-
cifically limited to the debtor'sinierest in the realty. Hunter v. Citizens Say. &
Trust Co., 157 Iowa I68, 138 N. W. 475 (ig12). See First State Bank v. Jones,
lO7 Tex. 623, 630, 183 S. W, 874, 876 (igi6). (The reason why the lien at-
taches only to the debtor's iiterest is that the lienor is not an innocent pur-
chaser; if the debtor actually has ho iilteiest in the real estate, the lienholder
loses nothing. He ktill has his jildgment.)
. 'O'Connor V. Georgia Railroad Bank, 121 Ga. 88, 48 S. E. 716 (1964);
Dobbins V. First Nat. Bank, 112 Ill. 553 (i885) ; Johnson v. Schlosser, 146 Ind.
509, 45 N. E. k2 (1897). But cf, Swift & Co. v. Dowling; 151 Ga. 449, io7 S.
E. 49 (I92I)3 where it was held that execution must issue and be entered in the
execution docket within ten days or the lien will date from such entry on the
exbecutibn docket
BMartinovich v. Marsicano, 137 Cal. 354, y6 Pac. 459 (902) Sterling v.
Parker-Washington Co., r85 Mo. App. 192, i70 S. W. 1,56 (1914); Sklower v.
Abbott, i9 Mont 228, 47 Pac. 90o (I897).
'Bradford v. Morrison, 21i U. S. 389,,29 Sup. C. 349 (i9o8); Davenport
v. kafnes, 2b Ill. 465 (i873) F Pitle" v. Johri, 178 Pa. 1i2, 35 AUt. 976 (1896);
Rodgers v. McClubt, 4 Gratt. 81 (Va. 1847).
" James v. Hubbard, i Paige 228 (N. Y. I828),
'Breed v. Gorham, iO8 Ill. gr (i83) ; jenkihs v. Gowen, 37 Miss. 444
(t859) ; McClung v, Beirne, 1o Leigh 394 (Va. 1839) ; Coad v. Cowhick, 9 Wvo.
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inference that the legislature-in the absence of express stipulation
in regard to after-acquired property-intended that the land which
the debtor acquires subsequent to the judgment should help satisfy
that judgment in the same way as the real estate owned by the debtor
when the judgment was docketed.
Pennsylvania and Ohio, however, hold that a judgment lien does
not attach to land which the judgment debtor subsequently acquires. 2
The precedent of an early Pennsylvania case,"R and the well-settled
custom of lawyers and purchasers not to look for judgments against
the owner prior to his acquisition of the land, have prevented Penn-
sylvania from adopting the more logical view. Recognizing the weak-
ness of its position, Pennsylvania has made some exceptions to its
rule. Thus, a lien will attach to improvements made upon the real
estate which was owned at the time the judgment was docketed. 4
Furthermore, a lien may attach to the equitable interest of the judg-
ment debtor in land, and this will be extended so as to attach to the
legal interest which the debtor subsequently acquires in the same
land."5 However, in spite of these exceptions, Pennsylvania subjects
the judgment creditor to a disadvantage. As soon as he learns of
the debtor's acquisition of real estate, the creditor must issue execu-
316, 63 Pac. 584 (i9oo) ; i BLACx, op. cit. supra note 4, § 432, n. I91; 2 Flm-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 955, n. 13.
The lien attaches even though the newly acquired land be not recorded.
Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation, 35 La. Ann. 829 (1883); Logan v. Her-
bert, 3o La. Ann. 727 (1878).
' Roads v. Symmes, i Ohio 28, (1824); Stiles v. Murphy, 4 Ohio 92
(1829) ; Colhoun v. Snider, 6 Binn. 135 (Pa. 1813) ; Sherrard v. Johnston, 193
Pa. 166, 44 Atl. 252 (1899) ; In re Marcus, 32 F. (2d) 719 (W. D. Pa. 1929).
It is immaterial whether the land is acquired by descent or purchase. Pack-
er's Appeal, 6 Pa. 277 (1847).
Iowa followed the Pennsylvania rule in Harrington v. Sharp, i Greene 131
(Iowa 1848) but later changed it by statute. IOWA CODE (1924) § 11602. Ware
v. Delahay, 95 Iowa 667, 64 N. W. 640 (1895) Cf. Filley v. Duncan, I Neb.
134 (187) (dictum commented favorable on Pa. rule); Colt v. Du Bois, 7
Neb. 391 (1878) (disapproved of this dictum).
' Rundle & Murgatroyd v. Ett-vein, 2 Yeates 23 (Pa. 1795).
"4Bradley v. Ritchie, 12 D. R. 658 (Pa. 19o3).
Stephen's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 186 (Pa. 1844) ; Stewart v. Coder, iI Pa.
go (1849) ; Brownfield v. Mackey, 27 Pa. 320 (1856) ; see Adams v. Hoffman,
2 Woodw. 93 (Pa. I871), in which Woodward, J., says that this doctrine has
been termed an exception to the rule of Colhoun v. Snider, but that they are
really two independent rules, for this doctrine was enunciated in Carkhuff v.
Anderson, 3 Binn. 4 (Pa. I8IO), three years earlier; Fire Brick Co.'s Assigned
Estate, 183 Pa. 96, 99, 38 AtI. 519, 520 ('897).
Upon the union of the equitable and legal interests the lien on the equitable
interest automatically extends to the legal interest. Since this lien dates from
the docketing of the judgment, there can be no question in Pennsylvania as to
the priority of judgment liens on after-acquired real estate. Water's Appeal,
35 Pa. 523 (i86o) ; Ziegler's Appeal, 69 Pa. 471 (1871).
Ohio, however, does not grant liens on equitable interests. Manley v. Hunt,
i Ohio 257 (1824) ; Schuler v. Miller, AC; Ohio St. 325, 13 N. E. 275 (1887);
Bank v. Christy 2o C. C. 0. (N. s.) 82 (Ohio 1914).
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tion on his judgment." And yet even this activity may be fruitless
if, in the interim between the acquisition of the land and the execu-
tion on the judgment, another creditor either has obtained a lien by
the docketing of his judgment or has levied upon this real estate.
In those states which permit a judgment lien to attach to prop-
erty acquired by the judgment debtor subsequent to the docketing of
the judgment, this problem is presented. When two or more creditors
have obtained judgments at different times and the judgment debtor
subsequent to the obtaining of the last of these judgments, acquires
real estate insufficient in value to satisfy both judgments, what prior-
ity, if any, in regard to this after-acquired real estate shall exist
among these judgment creditors?
Oregon has adopted the view that the judgment creditor xwho
first docketed his judgment has a prior lien on the after-acquired
property.17  This view may perhaps be justified on the particular
wording of the statute,'8 but the Oregon court attempts further to
justify it on principle, without regard to their statute. It is asserted
that, at the docketing of the judgment, the judgment creditor has an
inchoate lien with respect to property to be later acquired. Upoi
the debtor's acquisition of such real estate, this inchoate lien is related
back to the docketing of the judgment.i9 Such a theory, however,
seems unsound. Alien cannot exist without subject matter to which
it can attach. Since at the docketing of the judgment there was no
such real estate to which a lien could attach, to say that the judgment
creditor had an inchoate lien is simply to resort to a fiction. All'he
had was the possibility of securing a lien on real estate which the
judgment debtor might subsequently acquire. Only the debtor's ac-
quisition of this real estate can convert the possibility into an actuality,
i e., a lien. However, since the possibilities possessed by the several
judgment creditors materialized at the same time, it would seem that
they should be treated as equal liens with respect to this newly ac-
quired property, just as in some states judgmfeht liens, resulting from
judgments rendered on the same day, are treated as equal liens on the
debtor's then owned real estate.
20
The remaining jurisdictions have adopted the view that, since
the liens simultaneously attach at the time when the judgment debtor
"'Ross & Co. v. Elsbries' Appeal, io6 Pa. 82 (1884) ; Myers v. Holebrand,
3 Walk. 327 (Pa. 1884).
1 Creighton v. Leeds, Palmer & Co., 9 Ore. 215 (i88t),
'Om. LAWs (Olson, i920) § 2o5: "From -the date of the docketing of a
judgment as in this title provided, or a transcript thereof, such judgment shall
be a lien upon all the real liroperty of the debtor within the county or counties
where the same is docketed or which may be afterwards acquired therein." But
see Hertwick v. Fearon, iSo Cal. i, I79 Pac. i9o (igi) (similar statute, CAL.
CODES OF CIV. Paoc. (Deering, i015)) § 671, construed to grant no priority as to
after-acquited property).
Creighton, v. Leeds, Palmer & Co., supra note 17.
Gay v. Rainay) 89 11. 221 (1878); Hollcraft v. Douglass, 15 Ind, 139,
i' N. E. s (88) ; Townsend v. I~eht-y 26 Miss. 203 (1853).
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acquires his real estate, they are of equal rank.21 Therefore, at that
particular moment neither lienholder possesses any priority over
the other. However, a vast majority of these states hold that that
judgment creditor who first issues execution on his judgment does
by his superior diligence obtain a priority over the other judgment
creditors.22 This holding admits that the lien has been completed by
the debtor's acquiring the land but also asserts that, since the lien is
merely the right to go against any portion of the debtor's land, the
act of issuing execution is sufficient in itself to secure priority. Two
early New York cases 23 furnish the main precedents for this line of
authority. However, neither precedent nor equitable maxims 24 seem
sufficient justification for this view. In the absence of statutory
provisions to the contrary, a junior lienholder (one who dockets his
judgment subsequent to another judgment creditor) cannot as re-
gards real estate owned by the debtor at the time both judgments
were respectively docketed gain priority over a senior lienholder by
levying on such real estate.2 5 In fact the junior lienholder takes
subject to the senior creditor's lien. While the analogy between the
situation and that creating our problem is not perfect, since the liens
in the former situation are from the beginning unequal, yet this
analogy serves to bring into relief the idea that the lien is something
more than a right merely to go against the debtor's land. It is a
right which contains, as one of its niost valuable ingredients, an
assurance of the continuous security of the real estate for the satis-
faction of the judgment debt, regardless of whatever subsequent in-
cumbrances or transfers to which the land may be subjected. Thus a
conveyance of the land by the debtor to a third person does not, as has
"Michaels v. Boyd, i Ind. 259 (1848); Cayce v. Stovall, 50 Miss. 396
(2874) ; Matter of Hazard Estate, 73 Hun 22, 25 N. Y. Supp. 928 (1893);
Moore v. Jordan, 117 N. C. 86, 23 S. E. 259 (I895); Relfe & Co. v. McComb,
2 Head 558 (Tenn. I859).
"This rule is applied whether the judgment liens are equal because of the
judgments having been rendered on the same day, at the same term, or because
they attached at the same time upon after-acquired real estate. Bliss v. Wat-
kins, I6 Ala. 229 (2849) ; Smith v. Lind, 29 Ill. 23 (1862) ; Elston v. Castor,
IO Ind. 426 (1884); Lippencott, Johnson & Co. v. Wilson, 4o Iowa 425 (i875) ;
Burney v. Boyett, I How. 39 (Miss. 1834) ; Bruce v. Vogel, 38 Mo. ioo (1866).
But cf. Kisterson v. Tate, 94 Iowa 665, 63 N. W. 350 (1895), where a distinc-
tion was made between judgment liens equal because the judgments were ren-
dered on the same day and judgment liens because the liens attached simultane-
ously to after-acquired property. In the latter case, Iowa held that the general
rule did not apply. No reason, however, is given for this distinction.
'Adams v. Dyer, 8 Johns. 347 (N. Y. i811); Waterman v. Haskin, i2
Johns. 229 (N. Y. 1814). But cf. with these two cases Metzler v. Kilgore, 3 P.
W. 245 (Pa. 2832).
" Viqilantibus, non dorincntibus, jura subvenihnt. The law assists those
who are vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
'Rankin v. Scott, 25 . S. 177 (1827) ; Hermdon v. Bradley, 146 S. E.
495 (Ga. 1929) ; Jackson v. Holbrook, 36 Minn. 494, 32 N. W. 852 (887);
Gambrill v. Wilcox, 1i N. C. 42, i5 S. E. 685 (1892).
YOTES
alkeady been noted;.affeet the lien 2  There would ,seem to be nogood rea~~'rA why this asic qtilty of the lien; which is universally
recognized' dihd given 'efict to 'eie thei-e 're othei liens of infeiior
rank; sl i6ild be dehied whbi. the-e ire other liefis f equal rank. Just
as the sehibr lienholder is hot made to siAfek merely because a junior
iieihold~r has happeied t levy first, so a lierholder should not be
hiade to siffer rerely becaiise 'a lienhoder, eq iai iA rank has happened
to levy first. Furthermore, tiere wbuld seeim to be no particular
public poiicy in favor 6f hastening 5xcitiori of judgments., Cer-
tainly tle is _bh iii the cdse 6f liehholders of equai rank which is
not eqallya i;piicpitibi n' ithe cse ot senior and junioi lienholders.
This the.jtirisdicti6tis A dptiiig tle maj6iA ,iew geem to fall ifito an
unw~rrrited iticbisist§ency.
Consequently, it i;otild eeni that iot oily should judgment lieh's
attaching siiiultaieotisly to ift4-acquired real etate be considered
of equal railk; but that they should be permhitted to retain this equality
uhtil their sati. faction, everi though bne of the equal lienholders first
issiues execit!6ri on his judgment. .i the evenit bf such executi6n
the other equal liehhblder bi: li'hbolders sh6uld share pro. rata in the
pioceels. This posiioni, iviich i6;as taken b4 the New York Court 'of
Appeals in i91 6;27 seems.the hlost logical s6lioni8 to the problem,
Since i916 this -r~b|iI has arisen for ciiAudication in two juiis-
dfct ois .talforti , iWtfhout minion .he New York decisi6ni,
followed he hi4.ty oeight df a hority nd .ilp;k 1 the diligent lien-
h6ldr t5 aih prlbriy.28 1i the recent case df Zink v. James River
Se casssra note 9.
vH.#bVrt ; lbert; 216 N Y. 436,, -i- . k 70 (i9i6), (three justices
dissenting); voerrijlinj Adhiis,v. Dyer ,knd , aternan, y. Haskiri, both srupranote 23. Thecpurt attei~pted togiguish the ca s on.the ground that the
older cises weK6 decided when it -was debatable ,whethegtlie lien arose from the
judgiiedit 6r whether ats of exectidonvWere necessary for the consummation of
the lien., Siii lditer statutes specifically havestated that- the lien arises from
the jiudgmebt, tli& touir conclfded that ihe 6rly as~s jveie not bindihg as au-
thority. Ho~re er ,,h4 earily q'ais - e'hi cleiirk ,t6 be oveiruled because there is
in fact no re ldistiiiction behveen the later sthtutes, d id the necessary impljica-
tion froini laiigiage ised in the state ilndei which the early eases were decided.
.Decision commfended. iii Note (i9,26). 2jHARv. L. RU. 755; criticized in
Note (i916) 16 Com. L, Rivi 237;.Note ,(i9i), i4Mic. L. Rav. 4o2; (1929)
i7 CALIF. L. REv. 6go, in which .it vas suggested thA,, ihi regard to the property
ah to which ihe judgmnt creditors possess equal judgment liens, the creditors
hive the same statiis as. general creditors, and; therifore, the one who first issues
exectition should obtain prioilty. This suggestion is certainly unsound as re-
gards the relatiori of one of. seveprhl equal lienholders to a creditor who secures
A jidgneni suibsequent to the debtor's acqiistion 6f the property in question.
However, the sugg~stiofi Was probably intedd to be limited to the 4tatus 'of
'~jual lenholdet tth regrd to cacti o Everi as so limited, ,its only justi-
fieaiidii lies in the ex itence ,f , pu iluc olicy ih ,favor of hastening execution;
strog en6ugh id destrok- thechaiactet. of te right, possessed iy the lienholder.
The exkistence of this puiblic '.oliky; as has aWieady been submitted, is very ques-iid6ble.
"inklfei v. Fearfon, msutpra ni M8
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Bank,2" the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a full and well-reasoned
opinion adopted the New York rule. It is to be hoped that the logic
of the New York view will effect further departures from the ma-
jority rule.
G. M. B., Jr.
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES FOR, THE TRANSMISSION
OF LIBELOUS MATTER-The problem of whether a telegraph company
should be liable civilly for the transmission of a libelous message over
its wires is by no means res nova. Hitherto, the consensus of opinion I
has been, with but an occasional murmur of dissent,2 that the tele-
graph company is liable. In the recent decision of Flynn v. Reiiike,
"
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to have stemmed the
current of cases, and recovery against the telegraph company was
unequivocally denied.
A libel has been defined as a publication of false matter, by
means of writing, or anything that is the object of sight, calculated
to bring a person into disrepute.4  Falsity, publication, malice-
actual or implied, are the essentials of a libel. It is apparent then,
that an inquiry concerning the presence of these elements must form
the basis of any discussion as to the existence of liability in the given
factual situation.
The inquiry may be premised with the assumption that falsity
24 N. W. goi (N. D. I929).
'Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1O4 Fed. 628 (C. C. D. Minn. i9oo);
Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 67 N. W. 646 (1896) ; Paton
v. Great Northwestern Tel. Co., 141 Minn. 430, 17o N. W. 511 (1919); Whit-
field v. South Eastern Ry., i E. B. & E. 115 (Eng. 1858) ; Great Northwestern
Tel. Co. v. Archambault, 3o Lower Can. Jur. 221 (1886) ; cf. Stockham v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., where recovery was denied only because the message was
not clearly libellous; see Dominion Tel. Co. v. Silver, io Can. Sup. Ct. 238, 261
(1881), where liability was predicated at least partially upon the fact that the
telegraph company was not merely transmitter, but one of its officers actually
sent the defamatory message under a contract to supply news to a newspaper.
It is noteworthy that both Canadian cases emphasize the fact that the messages
were known by the company to be intended for newspaper publication and both
contain somewhat vague individual dicta to the effect that there might have been
no liability had the sendee of the telegram been a private party.
2Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 5th, I9o6);
Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 238 Mo. 480, 142 S. W. 27I (1911). Neither
case is a square authority on its facts for the holding of non-liability. In the
former case, the message was accepted by an unauthorized boy. In the latter,
the defamatory nature of the message was doubtful.
*225 N. W. 742 (Wis. 1929). Here the telegram was sent, properly signed,
from Wisconsin over the defendants' line to the plaintiff in Iowa. It read in
part: "Advise . . . how you wish to settle on money collected . . . ot
else face embezzlement charge along with Martin who is now under arrest. ...
The message charged plaintiff with the crime of embezzlement and was there
fore defamatory per se. NEWELL, SLANDER & LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) § 9.
"Ibid. §i.
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exists. The legal signification of the word is entirely in accord with
its ordinary lay definition.
The consideration of the element of publication in the telegraph
cases under discussion reveals two varying fact situations. In the first,
the party defamed is one other than the addressee of the telegram.
Here it is clear that there has been a publication by the company to
the addressee. The other situation is that in which the party de-
famed is the recipient of the message. The question- of whether
there has been a publication in this case requires more careful
analysis.
Publication, as used in the law of libel, has a peculiar juristic
connotation. As one learned writer has defined the term, it is "the
communication of the defamatory words to some third person or
persons. . . The communication must be intelligible to and
understood by some third person." 5 The gravamen of the action
is the injury to plaintiff's reputation. Thus, a statement of the
defamation to the plaintift alone,G or in a hnguage not understood
by those present,7 or in verbiage so complex as not to be understood
by a child who is the sole third party," alike constitute no publication
because the reputation of the plaintiff is not affected. Thus the mere
hearing or reading of words without such grouping of them as to
make intelligible sense should not constitute a publication, because
thereby plaintiff's reputation is as unaffected as if the message were
in cipher.9 Consequently, it should follow that where a telegraph
operator, almost mechanically receiving a message over the telegraph
wire as part of his routine work, takes it down word by word with
no attempt to piece its thought together, no publication has been made
to him.10 When from his pencilled copy, the message is typed by
Cameron v. Cameron, 162 Mo. App. iiO, 144 S. W, I71 (1912) ; Blaser v.
Krattiger, 99 Ore. 39:z, 195 Pac, 359 (ig2i); ODGmEs, LIBEL & SLANDER (6th
ed. 1g9) 131.
I P nry v. Dozier, 161 Ala. 292, 49 So. 909 (igo) ; Yonsling v. Dare, 122
Iowa 539, 98 N. W, 371 (19o4) ; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 Atl. 730
(19oI),
'Jones v. Davers, Cro. Eliz. 496 (1596); Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa 134
(1869). At one time, in the case of slander, an averment was required to the
effect that those whQ were present understood that language, Fleetwood v.
Curie, Cro. Jac. 557 (162O). Although today no such averment is necessary,
the fact of comprehension must still be proven at the trial.
'Sullivan v. Sullivan, 48 Ill. App. 435 (1892). Con tra: Hammond v.
Stewart, 72 Ill. App. 512 (1897), which without any discussion at all, or men-
tion of the earlier case in its own jurisdiction, declared that the utterance of the
same charge made in the former case, in the presence of a child six years old,
was a publication.
'Here. there would clearly be no liability. Great Northwestern Tel. Co. v.
Archambault, srupra note r, at 222.
"Such an analysis does not seem to have been made by the courts. They
apparently take it for granted that the operator receiving a message over the
telegraph wire so comprehends it that a publication has necessarily taken
place. Peterson v. Western Union Tel, Co., suprg note i, at 23, 67 N. W. at
647; Great Northwestern Tel. Co. v. Archambault, supra note i, at 22.
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another employee for delivery, or is read over the telephone to the
sendee in lieu of physical delivery, the possibility of a coherent in-
telligible recognition by the employee of the thought contained in
the telegram is much greater. Yet even here, it may well be argued
that there has been not even a technical publication. The communi-
cation is not of a thought, but of mere words.11
However, an even clearer ground than absence of publication,
which would apply to both types of telegraph cases, points to the
non-liability of the telegraph company. This ground is that of privi-
lege. "A privileged communication is a communication which under
ordinary circumstances would be defamatory, made to another in
pursuit of a duty, political, judicial. social or personal." 12 The law
presumes malice in the case of every defamatory publication. Privi-
lege rebuts this presumption. 13 The doctrine of privilege permits
defamation in certain cases, upon the basis of "a balancing of con-
siderations, the weighing of benefits to result and where the welfare
of society is better promoted by a freedom of expression. . ,, 11
Such a balancing of considerations seems to suggest the exten-
sion of privilege to the telegraph company. The company is a public
.service corporation. Prompt transmission of messages by it is in-
dispensable to the conduct of present-day affairs. Its duty is similar
to that of a common carrier. It is required to accept all messages
offered it for transmission, provided its charges be paid, its wires be
not burdened beyond capacity, and the message not manifestly im-
proper, e. g., obscene. The company is liable to the sender of a
message which it refuses to transmit, even if the refusal be based
"If it be conecded that there has been a publication to a fellow-employee,
the telegraph, company may not defend on the ground that this was an innocent
publication by the sending employee who was ignorant of the contents of the
message. The accepting agent, unlike other employees in the telegraphic chain,
is expected to read the message and become aware of its general import, for he
is charged with the duty of refusing all messages which are obscene or blas-
phemous. It is clear that such messages may be refused by the company. West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Lillard, 86 Ark. 208, 11O S. W. 1035 (i9o8) ; Peterson v.
Western Union Tel. Co. supr note i. In performing the function of weeding
out such objectionable telegrams, the agent, and through him, the company, is to
be charged with knowledge of the message communicated. Consequently the
company may not cite as exculpatory precedents the cases of a porter, or serv-
ant, carrying a libel in a closed parcel or envelope, of whose contents he is
entirely ignorant. Day v. Bream, 2 M. & Rob. 54 (837); Rex v. Dodd, 2
Sess. Cas. 33. In these cases the defendant had no opportunity to read the mes-
sage at all, and was therefore not liable.
That a defamation in a newspaper is unintentional is no defense to the pub-
lisher. Morrison v. Ritchie, 39 Scot. L. R. 432 (1902), where defendant
newspaper publisher, misinformed, and ignorant of the fact that plaintiffs had
been married only about one month, announced the birth of twins to them. A
newspaper is not a public utility, need not print all the news it receives, and
consequently may not claim the same consideration as a telegraph company.
NEWEL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 340.
NEWFut, op. cit. sitpra note 3, § 342.
Flynn v. Reinke, supra note 3, at 743.
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upon a mistaken belief that the message suborns the commission of
tort or crime. 15 Because of the importance and high public account-
ability of the telegraph company, it should be granted the compensa-
tion of privilege in cases of non-intentional defamation.
The telegraph company is in no position to pass upon the ques-
tion of whether a proffered message is defamatory. Its acceptance
agents are insufficiently versed in the law of libel to decide that ques-
tion themselves. Nor would it be practical to send all doubtful
messages to central stations to be there passed upon by legal experts.
As pointed out in the principal case, 16 such a plan would have three
objections. It would put the defamatory statement before more
people, and give it more attention, than if it were actually transmitted
through the ordinary channels. It would retard the communication
of messages where speed is paramount. Finally it would be a direct
violation of the almost universal statute that messages'must be dis-
patched in the order accepted,'" unless all later messages are to be
held up in the log-jam until the doubtful message has been passed
upon.
Even expert legal opinion upon the validity of a message would
not insure the company against liability. A message defamatory in
wording may be privileged, or it may bie true, or there may be other
defenses open to the sender.'" In such a case, the telegraph com-
pany, as the sender's innocent instrumentality, would a fortiori find
the defense available. Thus, a wire "Richard Roe is wanted in
Pennsylvania for bigamy" may be libellous,. but if sent by a father
to his daughter the morning of her wedding day to prevent a threat-
ened wrong, it is conditionally privileged as being in the interest of
the recipient. 9 Not only would that message be no actionable libel,
but the telegraph company could be held in damages for refusal to
transmit it."0 . A message equally defamatory in appearance may be
-designed to give the addressee the vital intelligence that he is charged
with crime. For refusal to transmit such message an action should
lie. In thus being compelled by the law to choose at its peril, between
the risk of being liable for refusal to transmit, or for libel, the tele-
Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 2; Gray v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 87 Ga. 350, 13 S. E. 562 (i89i).
Flynn v. Reinke, supra note 3, at 743.
'7 Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 2, at 492, 142 S. W. at
272; Flynn v. Reinke, supra note 3, at 744.
'At common law truth is a complete defense in a .civil action for defama-
tion. Astruc v. Star Co., 182 Fed. 705 (S. D. N. Y. igio) ; Courier-Journal v.
Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (19ir) ; Pease v. Bamford, 96 Me. 23, 51
At. 234 (19oi). Some statutes likewise require good motive. Briggs v. Brown,
55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325 (19o8).
" The statement of a near relative of the recipient with reference to the
character of the latter's suitor is privileged. McBride v. Ledoux, iii La. 398,
35 So. 615 (io4) ; Harriott v. Plimpton, i66 Mass. 585, 44 N. E. 992 (i896):
Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88 (1837).
' Cases cited supra. note i5.
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graph company finds itself caught upon either prong of a legal
Morton's Fork.
There are two additional practical considerations justifying the
extension of the defense of privilege to the company. The first is the
very slight practical publication possible, even if it be conceded that
a technical publication has taken place. Should an agent actually
note the contents of a message, he is forbidden by statute to divulge
it.
2
s The danger of interception of the message by "tapping"', which
was emphasized by a Canadian court,22 seems slight, and should no
more be blamed on the company than the publication by theft of an
unpublished libel may be blamed on the owner.
23
The second consideration is that in the practical conduct of its
defense the telegraph company is at a loss for the facts. It would
seem fairer to require the'plaintiff to sue the sender of the message,
whose knowledge of all the facts surrounding the sending of the
telegram may enable him to set forth a complete defense of which
the telegraph company would probably be ignorant.
There remains one doctrine which likewise exonerates the tele-
graph company. This is the rule which permits one agent of a cor-
poration to communicate freely with another on the corporation's
business, without liability for defamation unless there be actual
malice.. Sometimes this immunity has been placed upon the ground
of a fictitious single identity of all the servants of a corporation, so
that there is no technical publication when one c6mmunicates to
another a defamatory statement in the natural and ordinary course
of business. Its most frequent application has been in the case of
dictation by an employer to his stenographer. 24 Its effect in the tele-
graph cases would be confined to a holding of non-publication where
the sendee is the party defamed, for in the other possible situation
there is a plain publication to the sendee.
The fiction of the single identity of the entire business organiza-
tion seems an unnecessary makeshift. It has evidently been borrowed
from the somewhat archaic notion of the legal identity of husband
and wi'fe. The cases can undoubtedly be more satisfactorily ex-
2 Dominion Tel. Co. v. Silver, ;,pra note I, at 266; Grisham v. Western
Union Tel. Co., supra note 2, at 492, 142 S. W. at 272; Flynn v. Reinke, supra
note 3, at 744; Wis. STAT. (927) §348-36.
' Great Northwestern Tel. Co. v. Archambault, supra note I, at 222.
'Weirr v. Hoss, 6 Ala. 68i (1844).
Centital of Ga. R. R. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E. 429 (1916);
Owen v. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. S. 1033 (898). Contra:
Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (D. C. App. 1921), discussed in (1922) 70
U. OF PA. L. REv. 133; Gambrill v. Schooley, supra note 6; Pullman v. Hill,
[i89Ii i Q. B. 524.
g Sesler v. Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486, 21 Pac. 185 (1889) ; Wennhak v. Mor-gan, 2o Q. B. D. 635 (188). But one saouse may be defamed by publication to
the other, and the action will lie. Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, 24 AtI. 244
(1892); Jones v. Williams, I T. L. R. 572 (I885).
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plained on the ground of privilege .2 Such an explanation would
apply equally well to both types of telegraph cases.
The inquiry of this note has revealed that the telegraph cases
contain neither the element of malice, nor in most cases, that of pub-
lication. Consequently, it seems logical that irrespective of whether
the party defamed is the sendee, or is some other person, the telegraph
company should not be liable.
E.M.
Gloh Fiihrniture Co. v. Wright; 65 Fed. 873 (D. C. App. 192o) ; Prins v.
Holland-Nortli Amierica Mortgage Co., 1o7 Wash. 2o6, 181 Pac. 68o (ig);
Edmonson v. Birch, [Igo7] i K. B. 371; Morgan v. Wallis, 33 T. L. R. 495
(917) ; see Yotng B. Smith, Liabilit:9 of a Telegraph Company for Transmit-
ting a Defamatory Message (i920) 20 Col. L. REv. 30.
